I.INSTANCES WHERE DOUBLE PATENTING ISSUE CAN BE RAISED
A.Between Issued Patent and One or More Applications
B.Between Copending Applications—Provisional Rejections
1.Provisional Nonstatutory Double Patenting Rejections
2.Provisional Statutory Double Patenting Rejections (35 U.S.C. 101)
C.Between One or More Applications and a Published Application - Provisional Rejections
D.Reexamination Proceedings
II.REQUIREMENTS OF A DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTION (INCLUDING PROVISIONAL REJECTIONS)
A.Statutory Double Patenting — 35 U.S.C. 101
B.Nonstatutory Double Patenting
1.Anticipation Analysis
A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where a claim in an application under examination claims subject matter that is different, but not patentably distinct, from the subject matter claimed in a prior patent or a copending application. The claim under examination is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) if the claim under examination is anticipated by the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052, 29 USPQ2d 2010, 2015-16 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This type of nonstatutory double patenting situation arises when the claim being examined is, for example, generic to a species or sub-genus claimed in a conflicting patent or application, i.e., the entire scope of the reference claim falls within the scope of the examined claim. In such a situation, a later patent to a genus would, necessarily, extend the right to exclude granted by an earlier patent directed to a species or sub-genus. In this type of nonstatutory double patenting situation, an obviousness analysis is not required for the nonstatutory double patenting rejection. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection in this case should explain the fact that the species or sub-genus claimed in the conflicting patent or application anticipates the claimed genus in the application being examined and, therefore, a patent to the genus would improperly extend the right to exclude granted by a patent to the species or sub-genus should the genus issue as a patent after the species or sub-genus.
非法定ダブルパテント拒絶が適切なのは、審査中のクレームが、先行特許（prior patent）または同時係属出願（copending application）でクレームされた主題と異なってはいるが特許的に区別（patentably distinct）できない主題をクレームしている場合です。審査中のクレームが参照クレームと特許的に区別できないのは、審査中のクレームが参照クレームに予期されている（anticipate）ときです。参照：In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052, 29 USPQ2d 2010, 2015-16 (Fed. Cir. 1993). このタイプの非法定ダブルパテントが生じるのは、審査中のクレームが、例えば、抵触する特許または出願でクレームされている種（species）または下位の属（sub-genus）に対して一般的（generic）な場合であり、例えば、参照クレームの範囲全体が審査されたクレームの範囲内に入る場合です。このような状況で、ある属に対する後行特許は、種または下位の属を示す先行特許により付与された排他的権利を、必然的に拡大してしまうだろう。このタイプの非法定ダブルパテントにおいて、非法定ダブルパテント拒絶のために自明性分析は要求されない。このケースの非法定ダブルパテント拒絶は、抵触する特許または出願でクレームされている種または下位の属が、審査されている出願のクレームされた属を予期するという事実を説明しなければならず、従って、属の特許は、種または下位の属の後に特許されたならば、種または下位の属の特許に付与された排他的権利を不適切に拡大するだろう。
The analysis required is different in situations where the claim in the application being examined (1) is directed to a species or sub-genus covered by a generic claim in a potentially conflicting patent or application, or (2) overlaps in scope with a claim in a potentially conflicting patent or application but the potentially conflicting claims cannot be said to anticipate the examined claims. Both of these situations require an obviousness analysis unless one of ordinary skill in the art would, on reading the potentially conflicting patent or application, at once envisage the invention claimed in the examined application. See AbbVie Inc. v. Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366, 112 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, in the genus-species situation, the examiner typically should explain why it would have been obvious to select the claimed species or sub-genus given the genus claimed in the potentially conflicting patent or application. See MPEP § 2131.02 and MPEP § 2144.08 for discussions of genus-species situations with respect to anticipation and obviousness, respectively. Note that the genus-species and overlapping subject matter scenarios discussed in this paragraph may result in nonstatutory double-patenting rejections based on the principle against unjustified timewise extension of patent rights, discussed below in paragraph II.B.3.
2.Obviousness Analysis
(a)Construing the Claim Using the Reference Patent or Application Disclosure
(b)One-Way Test for Distinctness
(c)Two-Way Test for Distinctness
If the patent is the later-filed application, the question of whether the timewise extension of the right to exclude granted by a patent is justified or unjustified must be addressed. A two-way test is to be applied only when the applicant could not have filed the claims in a single application and the Office is solely responsible for any delays.In re Berg, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The two-way exception can only apply when the applicant could not avoid separate filings, and even then, only if the PTO controlled the rates of prosecution to cause the later filed species claims to issue before the claims for a genus in an earlier application . . . In Berg’s case, the two applications could have been filed as one, so it is irrelevant to our disposition who actually controlled the respective rates of prosecution.”); In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 106 USPQ2d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2013)("[P]rosecution choices resulted in the foreseeable consequence that the ′685 patent issued before the application claims on appeal. Given these circumstances, and because it is undisputed that the PTO was not solely responsible for the delay, Hubbell is not entitled to a two-way obviousness analysis." 709 F.3d at 1150, 106 USPQ2d at 1039.); see also In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applicant’s voluntary decision to obtain early issuance of claims directed to a species and to pursue prosecution of previously rejected genus claims in a continuation is a considered election to postpone by the applicant and not administrative delay). Unless the record clearly shows administrative delay caused solely by the Office and that applicant could not have avoided filing separate applications, the examiner may use the one-way distinctness determination and shift the burden to applicant to show why a two-way distinctness determination is required.
もし特許が後願であれば、特許に付与された排他的権利の時間的延長が正当化されるか否かという問題に触れなければならない。二方向テスト（two-way test）が適用されるのは、出願人が当該クレームたちを単一の出願で出願できなかった、かつ、いずれかの遅延に対して特許庁のみに責任がある場合のみである。In re Berg, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998) （「二方向例外を適用可能なのは、出願人が別々に出願することを避けられなかった、かつ、特許庁が審査速度を制御して後願の種クレームを先願の属クレームよりも前に発行した場合のみである。... Bergケースでは、２つの出願は１つの出願として出願できたのだから、実際に誰がそれぞれの審査速度を制御したかは関係ない。」）、In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 106 USPQ2d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2013)（「審査の選択は、'685特許が審判中の出願より前に発行するという予期できる結論となった」）、In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993)（「種クレームの早期発行させ、かつ、すでに拒絶された属を継続出願で審査させるという出願人の自発的な決定は、出願人による延長の選択だと考えられ、行政遅延ではない。」）。行政遅延（administrative delay）が特許庁のみにより発生したことと、出願人が別々に出願することを避けられなかったことを、記録が明確に示していない限り、審査官は一方向区別による判断をしてもよく、二方向区別のよる判断がなぜ必要かを示す責任は出願にシフトする。
When making a two-way distinctness determination, where appropriate, it is necessary to apply the obviousness analysis twice, first analyzing the obviousness of the application claims in view of the patent claims, and then analyzing the obviousness of the patent claims in view of the application claims. Where a two-way distinctness determination is required, a nonstatutory double patenting rejection based on obviousness is appropriate only where each analysis leads to a conclusion that the claimed invention is an obvious variation of the invention claimed in the other application/patent. If either analysis does not lead to a conclusion of obviousness, no double patenting rejection of the obviousness-type is made, but this does not necessarily preclude a nonstatutory double patenting rejection based on equitable principles. In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350, 158 USPQ 210 (CCPA 1968).
二方向区別の判断をする場合、適切であれば、自明性分析を2回、まず出願クレームの自明性を特許クレームの観点から分析し、その後、特許クレームの自明性を出願クレームの観点から分析する、を適用する必要がある。二方向区別の判断が要求された場合、自明性に基づく非法定ダブルパテント拒絶は適切であるのは、それぞれの分析がクレーム発明が他方の出願/特許のクレーム発明の自明なバリエーションであるとの結論を導く場合のみである。もしどちらかの分析が自明との結論を導かないならば、自明型ダブルパテント拒絶はなされないが、これは衡平の原則（equitable principles）に基づく非法定ダブルパテントを必ずしも排除しない。
Although a delay in the processing of applications before the Office that causes patents to issue in an order different from the order in which the applications were filed is a factor to be considered in determining whether a one-way or two-way distinctness determination is necessary to support a double patenting rejection, it may be very difficult to assess whether the administrative process is solely responsible for a delay in the issuance of a patent. 特許庁が出願順序とは異なる順序で特許発行させたという出願処理遅延は、一方向区別または二方向区別判断のどちらがダブルパテント拒絶のために必要かを決定する上で考慮すべき要素であるが、行政遅延のみが特許発行遅延の原因であるかを評価することはとても難しいかもしれない。On the one hand, it is applicant who presents claims for examination and pays the issue fee. 一方、審査するクレームを提示したり発行費用を払うのは出願人である。On the other hand, the resolution of legitimate differences of opinion that must be resolved in an appeal process or the time spent in an interference proceeding can significantly delay the issuance of a patent. 一方、審判手続で解決すべき合理的な意見の相違の鮮明度や、インターフェアレンス手続に費やした時間、は特許発行を著しく遅延させうる。Nevertheless, the reasons for the delay in issuing a patent have been considered in assessing the propriety of a double patenting rejection. それにもかかわらず、これらの特許発行遅延の原因は、ダブルパテント拒絶の妥当性を評価する際に考慮される。Thus, in Pierce v. Allen B. DuMont Laboratories, Inc., 297 F.2d 323, 131 USPQ 340 (3d. Cir. 1961), the court found that administrative delay may justify the extension of patent rights beyond 17 years but “a considered election to postpone acquisition of the broader [patent after the issuance of the later filed application] should not be tolerated.” 従って、～において、裁判所は行政遅延がIn Pierce, the patentee elected to participate in an interference proceeding [after all claims in the application had been determined to be patentable] whereby the issuance of the broader patent was delayed by more than 7 years after the issuance of the narrower patent. The court determined that the second issued patent was invalid on the ground of double patenting.
Similarly, in In re Emert, 124 F.3d 1458, 44 USPQ2d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the court found that the one-way test is appropriate where applicants, rather than the Office, had significant control over the rate of prosecution of the application at issue. In support of its finding that the applicants were responsible for delaying prosecution of the application during the critical period, the court noted that the applicants had requested and received numerous time extensions in various filings. More importantly, the court noted, after initially receiving an obviousness rejection of all claims, applicants had waited the maximum period to reply (6 months), then abandoned the application in favor of a substantially identical continuation application, then received another obviousness rejection of all claims, again waited the maximum period to reply, and then again abandoned the application in favor of a second continuation application substantially identical to the original filing. On the other hand, in General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 23 USPQ2d 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the court did not hold the patentee accountable for a delay in issuing the first-filed application until after the second-filed application issued as a patent, even where the patentee had intentionally refiled the first-filed application as a continuation-in-part after receiving a Notice of Allowance indicating that all claims presented were patentable. Where, through no fault of the applicant, the claims in a later-filed application issue first, an obvious-type double patenting rejection is improper, in the absence of a two-way distinctness determination, because the applicant does not have complete control over the rate of progress of a patent application through the Office. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 19 USPQ2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1991). While acknowledging that allowance of the claims in the earlier-filed application would result in the timewise extension of an invention claimed in the patent, the court in Braat was of the view that the extension was justified under the circumstances, indicating that a double patenting rejection would be proper only if the claimed inventions were obvious over each other — a two-way distinctness determination.
See, however, In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998), wherein the claims at issue could have been filed in the same application. The Berg court explained, “Braat was an unusual case; moreover, its factual situation is not likely to be repeated since the 1984 Act [amending 35 U.S.C. 116, and permitting joint inventorship even though not all inventors contributed to each claim] went into effect.” 140 F.3d at 1433-34, 46 USPQ2d at 1230.
参照：In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998)、この中で発行されたクレームは同一の出願で出願することができた。Berg法廷は次の通り説明した「Braatは普通でないケースだった、さらに、1984年法改正[116条を改正し、全ての発明者が各クレームに寄与していなくても共同発明関係を認めた]が施行されたため、そのような状況は繰り返されそうもない。」140 F.3d at 1433-34, 46 USPQ2d at 1230.
Form paragraph 8.33 and the appropriate one of form paragraphs 8.34-8.37 may be used to make nonstatutory double patenting rejections based on anticipation or obviousness analyses. See MPEP § 804, paragraph II.B.2.(b), above. See paragraph II.B.3, below, and form paragraphs 8.38 and 8.39 if the basis for the nonstatutory double patenting rejection is equitable principles.
8.33段落と8.34-8.37段落の内適切な１つは、新規性または自明性に基づく非法定ダブルパテント拒絶に使ってもよい。上記MPEP804段落II.B.2.(b)参照。非法定ダブルパテント拒絶が衡平の原則に基づくのであれば、下記段落II.B.3と段落8.38-8.39参照。
3.Nonstatutory Double Patenting Rejection Based on Equitable Principles
4.Design/Plant — Utility Situations
III.CONTRAST BETWEEN DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTION AND REJECTIONS BASED ON PRIOR ART
IV.DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTIONS AND PRIOR ART EXCLUSION UNDER PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c)
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